Tags
Venture Capital
Background
John Harris is the Managing Partner of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb, the flagship Sequoia Fund. We cover John’s approach to finding businesses that can be owned for the long-term, what goes into their diligence process, and the importance of resilience for investors.
Date
June 14, 2021
Episode Number
230
Principles & Lessons:
- Markets systematically misprice the potential for long-duration, nonlinear growth because most investors default to oversimplified, decelerating forecasts that are psychologically easier to justify but epistemically poor. John Harris notes that “pretty much anybody who's invested capital for a significant period of time will tell you that the world is not linear… and yet nobody seems to assume it.” Instead, most DCFs project slowing growth “asymptotically,” not because the evidence demands it, but because the alternative—sustained or accelerating growth—is too uncomfortable to model. This reflects a failure not of data, but of imagination. Recognizing this error allows investors to identify a subset of businesses with the capacity for high and sustained returns that the market cannot properly value because it structurally avoids reasoning in nonlinear, uncertain domains.
- True investment edge is often found not in the quantitative, but in the qualitative—particularly in understanding whether a business is as good as it looks or deceptively attractive. Harris points out that “the numerical part of what we do is the easy part… what's really hard is to figure out… whether what looks so good on paper is really as good as it looks.” This is an epistemic distinction: numbers can describe the past, but they cannot explain the mechanisms or causal drivers of a business. Harris emphasizes that qualitative diligence—“like a business owner, not a stockholder”—can reveal patterns (e.g., culture, incentives, flywheels) that do not show up in screens or models. The strongest signals occur when “the closer you look, the better it gets,” which he notes is rare, but powerful.
- Business quality is a key reducer of investment risk because high-quality businesses—often shaped by strong cultures and capable people—are more likely to surprise positively over time. Harris argues that what markets often miss is “how quality reduces investment risk.” The root of this reduction is not in statistical properties, but in adaptability and behavior. “People run and build businesses… and if you're with the right people… the surprises tend to be good ones.” Rather than measuring risk as variance, Harris implicitly defines it as the probability of negative surprises over time—making judgment about people and culture central, not peripheral, to understanding risk.
- Reinvestment risk—the challenge of finding new good investments—is often overlooked, and long-duration holdings in high-quality businesses are a way to minimize exposure to this hidden but significant risk. Harris explains that “every time you sell something and have to make a new investment, it's just another opportunity to be wrong.” This is a subtle but critical point: reinvestment risk is not just the challenge of deploying capital, it’s a compounding opportunity for epistemic error. The longer a great business can compound capital internally, the fewer decisions the investor must make, and the less room there is for cumulative mistakes. Thus, holding excellent businesses is not just about compounding—it’s about minimizing cognitive load and error accumulation.
- The most painful and consequential investing mistakes are typically not losses but missed opportunities, often due to insufficient imagination or overreliance on downside protection. Harris notes that his regrets list is “a mile long,” and that “not a single thing… involves something we actually did where we lost money.” Instead, the dominant regret pattern involves failing to act—or acting too timidly—on great opportunities. The MasterCard investment, where they made 100x but only sized it at 1%, is a key example. The issue wasn’t analytical error, but limited openness to “how right things can go.” The bias toward prudence over possibility constrains upside more than it protects downside—highlighting a fundamental asymmetry in how investment opportunity costs operate.
- Imagination is underemphasized in investing, yet it is often more decisive than discipline once basic competence is achieved. Harris argues that “there have been more investing fortunes made from imagination than there have from discipline.” This doesn’t mean that anything goes; “you just can’t do patently stupid things.” But once baseline rationality is in place, the scarce resource is not restraint, but vision: the ability to conceptualize possibilities beyond the consensus range. He ties this directly to the Sequoia fund’s results, noting that “probably 10 investments… have driven the vast majority of returns.” In these, being “really, really, really right” mattered more than avoiding being wrong elsewhere.
- Sustainable competitive advantage often comes not from elegant strategies but from businesses willing to do the hard, capital-intensive, or operationally messy work that others avoid. Harris values businesses that “get their hands dirty” and make themselves hard to copy through real-world complexity. Wayfair is one example, where scale, logistics, and marketplace infrastructure became moats not by design but by effort. UnitedHealth and Fastenal are other cases where accumulated systems, processes, and cultures create stickiness. “Hard is hard to copy” is the explanation—not in the abstract but in the causal path of why a business resists competition. Many of these advantages are invisible to standard analysis because they reside in execution, not theory.
- Resilience—across business models, portfolio construction, and psychology—is a more foundational goal than outperformance, because it enables survival and learning in a world of persistent surprise. Harris acknowledges that in any given year, their fund is unlikely to outperform managers “all in” on a popular theme. But over the long term, resilience—through diversification of business types, geographies, and sources of growth—provides the basis for a “good result, come what may.” He extends this idea to investor temperament, advocating for “a warm blanket” of personal support systems to withstand inevitable cycles. His conclusion is not about building invincibility, but about constructing epistemic and emotional systems that continue functioning under uncertainty.
Transcript
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