Background
Hamilton is the co-founder and Chief Investment Officer of Strategy Capital, as well as the author of 7 Powers, one of the best business books in history. We cover all 7 Powers, the best real-world examples of them, and how companies earn and keep those Powers over time.
Date
May 19, 2020
Episode Number
174
Tags
Strategy
Principles & Lessons:
- Durable strategic advantage requires both a benefit and a barrier — one without the other yields no Power. Hamilton defines Power as “something that creates value… but could not be easily arbitraged out by competitors.” The two necessary preconditions are a benefit (doing something better) and a barrier (preventing others from copying it). Intel’s early memory business had better chips, management, and manufacturing, but without a barrier, profits eroded: “they were a very, very well-run business… [but] it just was not going to be an attractive business.” Only when Intel entered CPUs with scale economies did they gain true Power. The distinction is critical — many firms have benefits, but “barriers are much rarer.” Without a barrier, benefits are temporary and arbitraged away.
- Power often emerges later through iterative path dependency, not from initial strategic clarity. Helmer emphasizes that early-stage businesses frequently start without Power, but “good companies… put a toe in the water and keep their eyes peeled.” Netflix didn’t know streaming would yield Power; their early catalog was weak and “was a pretty lousy catalog and not a lot of response.” But by iterating — first giving streaming away, then cutting a fixed-price deal with Epix — they discovered scale economies in content licensing. The key is not to avoid uncertain paths but to “be experimental, but very, very thoughtful.” Strategic frameworks guide exploration, but knowledge of Power tends to emerge through feedback and learning, not as a premise.
- Counter-Positioning is a particularly powerful and underappreciated form of Power, rooted in organizational psychology, not just economics. Counter-Positioning occurs when an incumbent “would need to blow up their old business model” to adopt a superior one — but they don’t, because the near-term pain outweighs perceived upside. Netflix vs. HBO and Dell vs. Compaq are examples. Helmer explains: “The pain of that is so great that they wait a long time.” Crucially, this is not about the feasibility of copying but about incentive incompatibility — the psychological and institutional difficulty of self-cannibalization. Incumbents aren’t unaware — they’re paralyzed. “They’re looking at… absolutely terrible known downside,” so they choose inaction. Power here isn’t technical; it’s embedded in human decision-making under uncertainty and loss aversion.
- Most commonly claimed Powers — like data network effects and learning economies — are frequently overstated due to nonlinearity and imitation. Hamilton critiques the reflexive assertion of data feedback loops as Power: “If I had a nickel for every time somebody said… I have the sunset.” In reality, benefits from data often flatten: “as it scales, that additional incremental benefit becomes less and less.” Netflix’s recommendation engine is a good example — highly sophisticated, but not strategic: “a mimic of it is good enough.” Similarly, learning economies rarely form barriers because knowledge is diffused, labor is mobile, and reverse engineering is pervasive. “We all hope to be learning all the time… but it’s rarely strategic.” Mistaking operational excellence for strategic defensibility is a recurring cognitive error.
- Branding as Power is not brand awareness — it’s the long-term accumulation of irrational preference or uncertainty reduction. Helmer draws a sharp distinction: “Branding as Power is a far narrower concept than brand awareness.” It arises when customers develop non-rational attachment or trust over time that is hard to emulate quickly. iPhones in the U.S. and Bayer Aspirin are examples: “they’re objectively identical but perceived as higher value” or “they just say, ‘Oh, Bayer, I know what that is.’” The critical constraint is time — this kind of brand association “takes a long, long period.” A Super Bowl ad may buy attention, but without persistent signaling and time, it cannot generate Power. Thus, branding is about slow epistemic change in customer minds, not short-term exposure.
- Not all network effects result in Power — they must be monetizable, significant, and sustained through structural feedback. Helmer emphasizes that network effects are “prevalent in narrative, but much rarer in monetizable Power.” Google’s search, he hypothesizes, works because “many of their searches are nearly unique,” so tail events become valuable. The user feedback loop — where clicks on unique queries improve future results — forms a subtle but powerful network effect. But most claimed network effects fail to meet the “three S’s”: superiority, significance, and sustainability. For example, Snap’s disappearing photos may be defensible in design but insufficient in monetization. The presence of a loop isn’t enough — the loop must be structured to accumulate differentiated value and fend off arbitrage.
- Process Power is real but vanishingly rare — it requires opaque complexity that cannot be copied even by close observation. Process Power comes from accumulated, often inarticulable improvements over time, embedded in a system. Toyota’s production system is Helmer’s canonical example. Even though Toyota “let other people tour their plants,” competitors couldn’t replicate it without the full sequence of steps. “It was very, very hard to do.” The crucial test is emulation resistance — not just time-consuming imitation, but something “so complex that… exactly what they did is either unknown… or at least opaque.” Most processes do not meet this bar; best practices diffuse too easily. Thus, while desirable, Process Power is more the exception than the rule — a warning against over-application.
- Power explains outcomes ex post, but its true utility lies in guiding high-uncertainty, forward-looking strategic decisions. Helmer closes with a distinction between strategy as a diagnostic tool and as an exploratory discipline. Power is most useful not to confirm what already works, but to guide bets under uncertainty. He critiques “nimble strategy” as misguided: “strategy is something that you’ve developed over a long period of time and you sort of refine it.” The creativity needed to find Power “comes from individuals,” not from formulaic reasoning. In that sense, the 7 Powers framework is not predictive in isolation — it’s epistemic scaffolding to help founders, investors, and strategists focus their search, not guarantee an outcome.
Transcript
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